The euthanasia debate: in reply to Lord Walton from being supplied with solvents, his claimed motive being his paternal love and care for his daughter. However, the pertinent question is whether he acted with intent when he clubbed the newsagent. This means little more than whether or not he acted deliberately, realizing that it was virtually certain that death or serious injury would result from his actions. As Lord Lane stated in 'Nedrick'":
Consider the case of the exasperated father of a solvent-abusing teenage daughter. After repeated remonstrations with the newsagent who supplies her, he entered the shop armed with a cricket bat. Let us accept that there is no doubt that the injury with the cricket bat will be deemed to be the cause of the newsagent's death. What occurred therefore presumably involved what lawyers would call an actus reus: a guilty act. The question is whether there was also a mens rea: a guilty mind. Did the father act with intent? This is not the same question as 'what was his intention?'. His 'intention', as defined above by Lord Walton (which Professor Ian Kennedy, for instance, would call his claimed purpose.') was to try to prevent his daughter Consultant Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he intended that result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen. Lord Walton's principal purpose, I assume, is to ensure that doctors who carry out ordinary palliative care can continue to offer pain relief to their patients even in the knowledge that they may thereby be shortening lives. He argues, in my view wrongly, that 'if the doctor's intention is clearly to relieve pain and suffering, with no intention to kill, then no legal problem arises'.
In contrast to Lord Walton, I would concede that doctors acting deliberately in the course of their professional duties can be presumed to be acting intentionally when they give palliative analgesics. Therefore they must do so in such a way that they would not be judged by any reasonable jury to be causing death. What is meant by an act causing death can best be defined by referring to Lord Devlin's summing up in the Bodkin Adams cases.
If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health, can no longer be achieved, there is still much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life. This is not because there is a special defence for medical men but because no act is murder which does not cause death. Weare not dealing here with the philosophical or technical cause, but with the common sense cause. The cause of death is the illness or the injury, and the proper medical treatment that is administered and that has an incidental effect on determining the exact moment of death is not the cause of death in any sensible use of the term. But. .. no doctor, nor any man, no more in the case of the dying than the healthy, has the right deliberately to cut the thread of life.
Doctors practising under the general law are therefore allowed to have 'an incidental effect on determining the exact moment of death', but this must not be 'the cause of death in any sensible use of the term'. If a doctor has not caused death there is no actusreusand his intent is legallyirrelevant. Thus the reason why there is such a crucial legal difference between injecting diamorphine and injecting potassium chloride does not concern whether the doctors act with intent, but whether the act would be construed as having been the cause of death and therefore as being a putative actusreus. It is the same reason why there is a difference between injecting large quantities of diamorphine into someone who is inevitably moribund and into someone who is otherwise not. However, I do not see that a doctor can admit that he foresaw that his action would in fact 'cause death', but then claim that he had no intention to kill because he desired something else.
Baroness Warnock, herself a member of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics", expressed the same point in her speech in the debate in the House of Lords? that:
... to many people this does sound like prevarication. If you know, or are reasonably certain, that an undesirable consequence will follow from what you intend to do, then in normal circumstances you are held responsible both for what you do and for the undesirable consequences. So, for example, if you know that your cat will almost certainly die if you spread weed killer on his favourite haunts, then you can hardly be absolved from responsibility for his death by claiming that all you intended was to kill the dandelions.
Those of us in favour of legalizingeuthanasia need to avoid charges of prevarication by being open that we are in favour of intentionally causing death in specifiedcircumstances, and that we regard it as a proper medical practice to do so. The argument is comparable to the present defence in allowing the deliberate infliction of surgical wounds (assaults which would otherwise be regarded as causing grievous bodily harm) in that, as Lord Scarman explained in 'Gillick', 'the bona fide exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgement must be a complete negation of the guilty mind'. However, I will argue below that, whereas influencing 'the exact moment of death' should be seen as part of ordinary medical practice, deliberately causing death should never be so. Ordinary terminal care involves a balance of sometimes conflictingprima Jacie duties to preserve life, to protect liberty (respect patient autonomy) and to prevent suffering. Sinceeuthanasia, whether active or passive, is by definition contrary to the primaJacie duty to preserve life, it may at times be a proper but should never be seen as an ordinary medical practice. It therefore needs to be kept on a separate legal footing.
A MORAL ARGUMENT
My second argument is that Lord Walton has failed to preserve the conceptual balance to be upheld between the needs of the individual and the needs of society. He adopts an absolutist 'pro-life' position in proscribing euthanasia, which should be seen as inherently, and thus inappropriately, authoritarian.
The arguments marshalled against legalizing euthanasia fall into two broad groups. The 'individual' ones, which can be seen as involving only two-party relationships (the patient and his practitioner), realistically anticipate how problems of abuse, duress, suggestibility and mental illness (particularly depression) might subvert the best interests of the individual. In my view these are sensible arguments for a careful clinical process, as will be described below. The 'societal' ones, however, entail three-party relationships in which it is held that the interests of the patient may sometimes be overruled in favour of the interest of protecting society as a whole. Lord Walton implies that such an argument should be regarded as paramount. Rather than thinking in terms of achieving a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society, he implies that the rights of society should always take precedence whatever the suffering endured by the individual. I suggest that this is unacceptably totalitarian. We need to restate the Kantian 'Formula of the End in Itself-that patients, as persons, must never be treated simply as 'means' but always at the same time as 'ends'.
Therefore, while I agree that there is some real merit in the societal arguments, it is important not to deny that they are inevitably harmful with respect to the individual. Applied in absolute form, particularly when emotively postulating a slippery slope, they therefore offend against the principle of non-maleficences, which is usually regarded as one of the cardinal principles of medical ethics. This is not to argue that there is no substance in the societal arguments, or that the rights of individuals should necessarily take precedence over the rights of society, but merely that care has to be taken to ensure that the interests of the one are judiciously balanced against the interests of the other. Weare back again to the notion of a balance of sometimes conflicting prima Jacie duties, rather than choosing any particular hierarchy of principles in an absolutist manner.
Those of us who would accept the idea that there is significant truth in the societal arguments, albeit only partial truth, need to distance ourselves from the converse position that the paramount principle should be the rights of the individual, normally expressed in terms of respect for patient autonomy. The 'pro-choice' position is equally unbalanced and should be equally rejected. Expressed in the language of rights, this means that what will be elaborated below does not assume or assert a 'right to die', and thus a derived 'right to euthanasia', but implies a more limited right to be excused from exceptional and futile suffering. Hence, it proposes a liberty to apply for euthanasia rather than any right to demand it.
A POLITICAL ARGUMENT
My third argument is that Lord Walton has been excessively, and perhaps unwisely, cavalier in his dismissal of the shift in public opinion. He denies that such a shift has been decisively demonstrated in opinion polls, stating that 'the result is invariably influenced by the way in which the questions are framed and posed'. However two replies can be offered to this opinion. The first is that it offers no explanation as to why polls repeating the same question over long periods of time (however nebulous critics may claim any particular question to be) have shown an obvious historical trend towards the acceptance of the idea of euthanasia .: The second is that all the current polls have given similar results however the individual questions were framed. Lord Walton would be challenged to produce a single recent poll which indicates that a substantial proportion of the general population agree with him.
One of the polls which I sent to the Select Committee'', which regrettably it omitted to publish and which therefore he may not have considered adequately, was designed precisely to test his thesis. It was commissioned by the World Federation of Doctors who Respect Human Life and was conducted by MORI in 1987. Presumably because it was commissioned by a group who are explicitly opposed to euthanasia, it deliberately eschewed euphemistic language. It read as follows:
Now I would like to ask you some questions about euthanasia. By euthanasia I mean when a doctor is allowed, by law, to terminate the life of a patient ... In Hollano, some doctors carry out euthanasia when their patients request it, by giving sedatives and injecting muscle relaxants so as to paralyse breathing. Some people have said the law in Britain should be changed so as to allow euthanasia in some circumstances as is done in Holland. Others believe the law should not he changed. (Show large card.) Looking at this card, which of these options comes closest to your view? Only 19% of a sample of 1808 agreed with Lord Walton that the law should not be changed. To describe such a poll as 'far from decisive' seems to me to be plainly wrong, and it seems doubly unfortunate that the Select Committee should have omitted to publish it before dismissing it. It seems safe to predict that public opinion polls will indeed prove politically decisive in the end; even in Britain.
However, it also needs to be noted that only 23% agreed that 'euthanasia should be made legal in all cases when the patient requests it'. By far the greatest proportion [49% (9% didn't know)] advocated the permissive but restrictive option. The real task therefore facing the Select Committee, from which I feel they shrank, was to examine the possibilities for suitable procedures and controls. It is to this alternative strategy that I will now turn.
SEEKING A DECLARATION FROM A COURT
I have argued above that euthanasia should not be seen as part of ordinary medical practice but be placed on a separate legal footing. The first step for those seeking to change the law may therefore be to use the Courts to 'reshape the law'3 by requesting Declarations in a manner analogous to the Tony Bland case". Thus, a patient wanting euthanasia could apply to the Family Division of the High Court, supported by medical recommendations, that in his particular circumstances euthanasia would be appropriate (on the grounds that it would be in accordance with his stated wishes and necessary for the avoidance of significant suffering). He would need to argue both the general point that a substantial body of respectable medical opinion believes euthanasia (and/ or physician assisted suicide) to be a proper medical practice on occasion (and therefore not intrinsically unlawful), and the particular point that in his own exceptional circumstances no other course of action would be satisfactory.
TOWARDS A TERMINAL CARE AND EUTHANASIA BILL
Only once the Courts were being asked for substantial numbers of Declarations is it likely that Parliament would legislate. However, the Courts are an expensive and in some ways unsuitable forum for such decision-making and arrangements similar to those contained in the Mental Health Act (MHA) might be more satisfactory. These should contain a dual mechanism 10. The basic idea would be to set up a system of Euthanasia Tribunals based on the Mental Health Review Tribunals (MHRT), perhaps as part of an expanded Court of Protection11 But it would also be possible to devise a simpler procedure whereby, in the more straightforward cases, the intent to perform euthanasia would be formally notified prior to the act itself (in contrast to the Dutch guidelines) without a Tribunal hearing. This would be directly comparable to a section 2 of MHA 1983 governing the compulsory admission of mentally disordered patients for assessment.
A patient requesting voluntary euthanasia would need to lodge a written application on a prescribed form to a registered medical practitioner. He would need to demonstrate that he was mentally and legally competent, that he was making the application in good faith and without coercion, and that his continued existence necessarily involved permanent and 'severe distress or indignity'. He should be required to inform his three nearest relatives. On receiving the application, the doctor intending to carry out the euthanasia would be obliged to examine the patient/applicant, to contact the relatives, and to seek a confirmatory medical recommendation from a second medical practitioner with an appropriate expertise. He would then submit both medical recommendations, together with the application, to the Tribunal Officer for registration. Only once the notification had been registered would the act of euthanasia be covered by the statute (as with the receipt of the application and recommendations by hospital managers for a section 2 of the MHA).
If the patient was not currently competent to submit an application on his own behalf for voluntary euthanasia, an application would have to be lodged for non-voluntary euthanasia by one of the relatives, but in this case the grounds would need to be more restrictive; e.g. 'exceptional suffering or degradation'. If the patient had previously (while still competent) signed an advance directive, the grounds could reasonably be relaxed. An advance directive might stipulate the proxy to make the application. Thus, perhaps when a patient knew that he was entering his final illness, he could sign an advance directive to endure into his incapacity, leaving the timing of the application to his trusted proxy.
If any of the nearest relatives, or either of the doctors, or the Tribunal Officer, was reluctant to proceed by notification, each would have the right to demand a Tribunal Hearing. This would have the advantage of causing the legal scrutiny to occur before the act rather than retrospectively, while having the disadvantages of being more expensive, intrusive of privacy and time-consuming. Individual Tribunals could presumably be chaired by a lawyer, and have a medical and general member, as with MHRT.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps I can best sum up the reason why I think the law ought to be chaJ.1ged by using a theological language, a language which can be used and understood irrespective of whether it is regarded as describing literal truths or as giving metaphorical expression to merely psychological realities. The crux of the debate is whether life should be viewed as a benevolent gift, freely bestowed by a loving God, or as a burden compulsorily imposed by an altogether more ambiguous, if not terrible, Being. The former implies an ethic of active responsibility, both for patients and for their doctors, rather than one of either timid obedience or of angry rebellion. In my view, the law should support and encourage such an ethic.
